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ESSAYS
PUNISHMENT, GUILT, AND SHAME IN
BIBLICAL THOUGHT
GEORGE P. FLETCHER*
The centrality of guilt in the criminal law provides puzzling
perspective in the perennial debate on the nature and purpose
of punishment. Why is it that all legal systems use this highly
charged moral term to refer to an essential component of liabil-
ity to punishment? This question is not easily answered. The
reliance on the concept of guilt in the criminal law is suffused
with paradox and mystery.
First, we do not really require guilt in order to punish; we
insist only that the defendant be found guilty-that is, in com-
mon law systems, that the jury return a verdict of "guilty." The
defendant need not feel anything, least of all actual guilt for hav-
ing committed the crime. Significantly, where we do probe the
defendant's sentiments, namely in sentencing, the relevant ques-
tion is not guilt but remorse or regret. A Virginia jury recently
imposed the death penalty on one of the Washington snipers,
John Allen Muhammad, and some of the jurors explained their
verdict to the press on the grounds that he did not express
remorse for the killings.' It probably would not have helped him
much to say that he recognized his guilt or that he felt guilty for
what he had done. The jurors wanted to hear something more
than that which they had already assumed.
We use the language of guilt and blame in the criminal law
without actually demanding that anyone feel guilty or that any-
one blame anyone else. The defendant must be blameworthy for
a wrongful act in order to be found guilty. If the act is commit-
ted under conditions of insanity or duress, the actor is not blame-
worthy. But to say that the actor is blameworthy is not to imply
that the judge or jury actually tenders a certain sentiment, a pos-
* Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University School of
Law.
1. James Dao, Sniper Mastermind Sentenced to Death, INT'L HERALD Tans.,
Nov. 26, 2003, at 5.
344 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 18
ture of blaming, toward the defendant in the dock. In the same
way that the defendant need not feel actual guilt, those con-
demning him need not tender a feeling of blame. On that par-
ticular day, the official actors in the legal system might feel
nothing at all. Still they are required, in their roles, to act as
though they actually blamed an offender who has no justification
or excuse for committing a crime. Obviously, the evidence-not
the transient sentiments of the officials-should determine liabil-
ity to punishment.
Thus, we use the language of guilt and blame in the criminal
law without expecting that anyone actually feels guilty or feels the
need to blame. It is as though we are watching a production of
Hamlet and know that Hamlet is supposed to feel ambivalence
about acting, but we do not know whether the particular actor
playing Hamlet feels anything of the sort.
Alasdair MacIntyre's notable comment about contemporary
moral theory could apply as well to the language of guilt and
punishment: "What we possess ... are the fragments of a concep-
tual scheme, parts which now lack those contexts from which
their significance derived."' In the field of criminal justice we
seem to be living in the afterlife of some other conceptual
scheme that was once rich with meaning. My task in this paper is
to engage and pursue that hypothetical Eden of meaning by
engaging in an archeological study of the concept of guilt. I will
examine the concept in one of its primary sources, the Bible-in
particular, the Hebrew Bible and the book of Genesis. These
texts are not the only sources of our concept of guilt and punish-
ment, but surely they must be among the formative texts of West-
ern culture.
I. GUILT As POLLUTION AND SACRIFICE
When we go back to the Hebrew Bible, we have some diffi-
culty pinpointing the exact emergence of the concept of guilt in
the narrative of creation and the patriarchs.' A good deal
depends on the translation of the word "guilt" into Hebrew.
Modern Hebrew relies upon the word "ashma" to capture the
idea of guilt in the criminal law. Variations on the root aleph-
shin-mem for ashma figure prominently in the biblical text but
there is no reason to assume that this is the only way to render
the concept of "guilt" in ancient Hebrew. For example, there is
2. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 2 (2d ed. 1984).
3. This article represents a revision of my thoughts as presented in the
Storrs Lectures. Cf George P. Fletcher, The Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics
at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499 (2002).
2004] PUNISHMEN, GUILT, AND SHAME IN BIBICAL THOUGHT 345
considerable dispute about the proper reading of the colloquy
between Cain and God after Cain slays his brother Abel and God
sentences him to become a solitary wanderer of the earth-a fit-
ting punishment for someone who has slain his brother. Cain
intervenes, "My avon is more than I can bear." The problem is
finding the right translation of avon into English or into any
other modern Western language.
The King James translation of the Bible popularized Cain's
lament as, "My punishment is greater than I can bear."' 4 This way
of rendering the text demeans Cain into someone who has com-
mitted fratricide and is unable to own up to the deed and accept
punishment for what he has done. Interpreting Cain's avon as
punishment fits well with the first murderers initial response to
God: "Am I my brother's keeper?"5 But there are many clues
that this translation is incorrect. For one thing, in the modern
Hebrew, the word avon refers to a misdemeanor, a kind of crime,
and not to the punishment for the crime. It would be proper,
therefore, to render Cain's statement as: "My sin [crime, iniq-
uity] is greater than I can bear." This would be, in effect, a con-
fession of guilt. For reasons I do not comprehend, translators
still gravitate today toward reading avon as punishment rather
than as crime or sin.
In my view, Luther got it right when he translated the verse
as: "Meine Sfinde ist gr6j3er, denn da3 sie mir vergeben werden
m6ge."6 ("My sin is greater than can be forgiven me.") In the
current on-line version of the translation, the editor has rewrit-
ten Luther's original to conform to the sense of the King James
translation. It reads: "Meine Strafe ist zu schwer, als da3 ich sie
tragen kfnnte."7 ("My punishment is greater than I can bear.")
The same bias is evident in the scholarship of James Kugel, who
concedes that early readers of the text read avon as "sin" or "iniq-
uity" but that this reading was, in his view, incorrect. His taking a
stand on this delicate issue requires a reasoned argument, which
he fails to provide.'
The common translation of "guilt" into Hebrew as asham or
ashma makes its first appearance in the biblical narrative in the
last of the three tellings of the story of a patriarch entering a
foreign land and fearing that the "barbarians" will kill him in
4. Genesis 4:13.
5. Genesis 4:9.
6. DIE HEILIGE SCHurFT 1 Mose 4:13 (1967) (Gideon version).
7. Menighetsfakultetet, Das Erste Buch Mose (Genesis), at http://www.
menfak.no/bibelprog/mb?lMO+4,1-5,6&bi=Luther (last visited March 19,
2004) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
8. SeeJAMES L. KUGEL, THE BIBLE AS IT WAS 96 (1997).
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order to gain the sexual favors of his wife. The pattern is always
the same: Abraham (twice) and then Isaac relive the same decep-
tion-each tells the foreign potentate (first Pharaoh and then a
king named Abimelech in the land of Gerar) that his wife is in
fact his sister. In all three cases something happens to inform
the potentate that either he or a man of his court is about to
commit adultery.
In the first version, after Abraham passes Sarah off as his
sister, Pharaoh takes her into court. Plagues then descend upon
"Pharaoh and his household" as a sign that a sexual sin has
occurred or is about to occur.9 Pharaoh quickly realizes that
something is wrong in the natural order and confronts Abraham
with his lie. In the second retelling of the same basic story, the
truth of sexual sin is realized not by a plague but by God coming
to Abimelech in a dream and saying, "You are but a dead man
because of the woman that you have taken, for she is a man's
wife."10 In the third telling, when Isaac passes off Rebecca as his
sister, a king also named Abimelech discovers the lie when he
sees them engaging in affectionate behavior that would be incest
if they were actually brother and sister. 1
Assuming that they are not an incestuous couple, Abimelech
confronts Isaac, establishes the lie, and then says: "What have you
done to us? One of the people might have lain with your wife,
and you would have brought guilt upon us."' 2 The one who is
responsible for the situation, the one who lied, is paradoxically
not affected by the guilt. Guilt is objective and it affects the
entire land where the sin occurs.
An analogy with Oedipus is compelling. 3 As Oedipus
brought a plague on Thebes by killing his father and marrying
9. Genesis 12:17 (New International Version).
10. Genesis 20:3. All translations of the Bible are my own, unless otherwise
indicated.
11. Genesis 26:8. The assumption that they are engaged in sexual behav-
ior derives from use of the verb Ltsachech to describe their activity. The verb is
often translated as "sporting"-a term that also carries a sexual connotation in
English. But no one is quite sure what the Hebrew word means. It also used a
key term describing Ishmael's offense against Isaac, an offense so egregious that
Sarah felt compelled to expel him from the household. Genesis 21:9. In that
context it is often translated as "mocking." But why should mocking be
regarded as so serious? It is more plausible to think of Ishmael as engaged in
some kind of sexual abuse of his younger brother Isaac. In any event, some
account is required to explain the use of the same verb to describe what was
done to Isaac and later to capture what Isaac and Rebecca were doing in front
of Abimelech.
12. Genesis 26:10.
13. SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS REx (R.D. Dawe ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1982) (c. 429 B.C.).
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his mother, Isaac brings guilt on the land of Abimelech. The
existence of the stain invites reflection about its cause, and the
investigation into the cause, of course, provides the structure of
Sophocles' play Oedipus Rex. The striking difference between
the Greek and the Hebrew story, however, lies in the personal
reaction to the incident that brings or threatens to bring the
stain on the land. Oedipus puts out his eyes with his wife
Jocasta's brooch and goes into voluntary exile. The text tells us
nothing about Isaac's feeling for having brought about this situa-
tion of potential stain and pollution.
In the second telling of this story, when it is Abraham rather
than Isaac who engages in the lie, Abimelech says something sim-
ilar to Abraham after the deception is revealed to the potentate
in a dream: "What hast thou done unto us? And what have I
offended thee, that thou hast brought on me and on my king-
dom a great sin?"' 4 Here the key word is not asham but chataah,
which is conventionally translated as sin.
As between these two references to a stain brought upon the
land, there is a good reason for taking asham'5 and not chataah'
6
as the first reference to "guilt." We find the same pattern in the
use of the word asham as we have already noted in the use of
avon, namely, a strong conceptual link between the ideas of guilt
(or sin or iniquity) and of punishment. Like avon, asham refers
ambiguously both to the deed and the effort to cleanse the world
of its stain.
The term asham comes into prominence in chapter five of
Leviticus, where we encounter the various forms of sacrifice nec-
essary to cleanse the world of its various forms of pollution. 7
Asham is the word used in this context to describe a whole range
of sacrifices. The prescription is to bring a "guilt sacrifice" to
atone for specific sins, and burnt offerings for others. The con-
ceptual merging of the deed and the remedy validates the gen-
eral biblical pattern. The easy interchange of the negative and
the positive, the contamination and the decontamination, reveals
a way of thinking totally different from the modern conception
of guilt.
Walter Burkert, a distinguished historian of Greek religion
and culture, has a different take on this easy association of guilt
and punishment in the ancient world. He suggests that those
14. Genesis 20:9 (King James Version).
15. Genesis 26:10.
16. Genesis 20:9.
17. Leviticus 5:6 ("And he shall bring his guilt offering to the Lord for the
sin that he has sinned.").
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who committed the offense requiring a sacrificial response actu-
ally tendered personal feelings of guilt and projected these sub-
jective feelings onto the sacrifice. 18 Though I was once skeptical
of this thesis as it applied to the book of Exodus, I now think the
matter is more complex than I once thought.1 9
The book of Genesis is ambivalent about whether guilt is
appropriately accompanied by feelings of guilt or whether there
might be feelings of guilt without any external pollution. Adam
and Eve might feel shame after they eat of the forbidden fruit
and discover their nakedness but there is no sign that they feel
guilt for having disobeyed God. Yet when Joseph's brothers
learn that the sibling they tried to kill is alive, well, and prosper-
ing, they cry in guilt for having ignored his pleas for help.2" This
tension within the book of Genesis reflects a dichotomy that is
generally assumed to juxtapose an ancient with a modern under-
standing of guilt.
II. FEELING GUILTY FOR WRONGDOING
In the modern approach to guilt, the focus is not on pollu-
tion but on the feelings of those who are guilty. The shift has
been from its external impact of guilt on the world to the inner,
human experience. The disengagement of the inner feeling
from reality has led to the supposedly modern phenomenon of
free-floating guilt, as exemplified in Kafka's novel, The Trial.2'
Joseph K expects to be tried for something, but he does not
know what. In another form of disengagement-this time both
from the impact of the action and from the actor's sentiment-
we now acknowledge that a suspect might be guilty even if he
does not feel anything and resolutely protests his innocence.
A careful reading of the Joseph story reveals that this way of
thinking is not uniquely modern. It is found in the book of Gen-
esis as well. To grasp the alternative model of asham or guilt
presented in the Joseph story, we should review the first part of
the tale in Genesis.22
The saga begins with a built-in conflict between Joseph and
his ten elder brothers. Jacob, their father, loves Joseph more
than the others and the ten are jealous. When some receive
18. Walter Burkert, Greek Tragedy and Sacrificial Ritual 7 GREEK ROMAN &
BYZANTINE STUD. 87, 112 (1966) (noting that "the community is knit together in
the common experience of shock and guilt" at the time of sacrifices).
19. For my earlier views, see Fletcher, supra note 3.
20. Genesis 42:21.
21. FRANZ KAFKA, HE TRIAL (Breon Mitchell trans., Schocken Books
1998) (1925).
22. Genesis 37, 39-42.
2004] PUNISHMENI, GUILT, AND SHAME IN BIBLICAL THOUGHT
more love than others, as Abel was favored by God, we can expect
enmity between brothers. The conflict among the sons of Jacob
becomes more acute when Joseph relates two dreams, which his
brothers interpret as a fantasy of domination over them. As the
astute German commentator Claus Westermann points out, this
was a startling new political idea-namely, that one brother
could acquire a superior political status to his siblings.23 The
brothers throw him into a pit and conspire to kill him, but Reu-
ben, the eldest, protests the plan to kill Joseph and suggests that
they merely leave him to die. This they do, and then sit down to
break bread, as though they were celebrating Joseph's demise.
At that point Judah sees a caravan of Ishmaelites approaching
and realizes that it might be better to sell Joseph to the voyagers
rather than kill him and conceal their act. Apparently, it does
not occur to him that selling their brother into slavery is also a
wrong that they would have to conceal from Jacob and others.
Before the brothers can realize Judah's plan, a band of Midi-
anites pass by. And some group (the text is ambiguous on this
point) lifts Joseph out of the pit and sells him to one of the pass-
ing caravans headed for Egypt.
Reuben discovers that Joseph has been taken and tears his
clothes in distress. To cover up their crime, the brothers then
dip Joseph's coat-Jacob's gift of love-in the blood of a slaugh-
tered goat and take it to Jacob as proof of Joseph's death. The
traveling merchants sell Joseph into the service of Potiphar, an
Egyptian official.
This is the end of the passage recounting the tale of crime
and betrayal. It is worth noting that no one in this story acts as
an individual. Only a collective acts in throwing Joseph into the
pit, and later, in lifting him out. The brothers function as a unit.
Even when Reuben protests, he speaks in the first person plural.
The next segment of the saga traces Joseph's rise to political
power in Egypt. When he meets his brothers again, at least a
decade later, he is the "governor over the land."24 With a famine
in Canaan, Jacob sends ten of the brothers, excluding the young-
est Benjamin, to find food in Egypt. When they encounter
Joseph, the ten bow down to him without recognizing him, but
Joseph recognizes them and recalls the dream.
25
There follows a conversation in Genesis that leads to the
brothers recognizing their guilt for the way they committed a
23. CLAUS WESTERMANN, DIE JOSEPH-ERZAHLUNG: ELF BIBELARBEITEN ZU
GENESIS 37-50, at 24 (1990).
24. Genesis 42:6 (King James Version).
25. Genesis 42:8-9.
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crime toward Joseph.26 The word used for guilt in this context is
the same as used in the story of Abimelech and Isaac. The pro-
cess by which they come to confess their guilt is one of the most
remarkable interactions in the corpus of biblical literature.
Joseph stages both a conversation and a physical environment
that leads his brothers to understand the moral dimension of the
way they had treated Joseph.
The first step in the interaction is Joseph's accusing the
brothers of being spies. It is hard to know whether Joseph him-
self believes the charge to be true or whether he is testing his
brothers. With his usual political insight, Westermann points out
that spying is a characteristic feature of nations, not of families.27
Joseph himself is acting as the officer of a state; his accusation of
spying is designed to find out whether the brothers are also act-
ing on behalf of a state or whether they identify themselves as a
family rather than a nation. The brothers defend themselves
against the charge by claiming that they are "the sons of one man
in Canaan."2 The Westermann thesis explains this response but
it seems strained nonetheless-individuals and informal groups
do, in fact, sometimes spy on each other.
A totally different approach to the accusation begins with
the motive that Joseph attributes to the spying, namely, "to see
the nakedness of the land."29 The sexual overtones of the word
"nakedness" suggest an analogy with the earlier intervention of
the brothers, the "sons of Jacob," to reclaim their sister Dinah
from the house of Schechem. Whether that rescue was deceitful
and improper or not, the brothers thereby demonstrated their
loyalty to members of the clan. By suggesting sexual overtones to
the mission of his ten brothers, Joseph might be revealing his
own yearning that they have to come to take him as they had




27. WESTERMANN, supra note 23, at 73. In the first translation of the Bible
into German, Martin Luther opted for a different term altogether. He trans-
lates the Hebrew term as "Kundschafter," which means something like "investiga-
tor." See DIE HEILIGE SCHRIFr, supra note 6, at 1 Mose 42:9 (1967).
28. Genesis 42:13.
29. The French Jewish translator Andr6 Chouraqui captures the sexual
dimensions nicely in his translation: Vous tes venus pour voir le sexe de la terre. See
LA BIBLE, Ent~te 42:12 (Andr Chouraqui trans., 1989). The sexual association
is missing in Luther's translation, where the passage is rendered as the "investi-
gators" coming to see "where the land is open." DIE HEILIGE SCHRIFT, supra
note 6, at 1 Mose 42:12 .
30. I am indebted to Rabbi David Silber for this interpretation.
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The problematic aspect of the brothers' response to the spy-
ing charge is the seemingly gratuitous addition to their claims to
be all the sons of one father: "[T]he youngest is now with his
father, and one is absent."3 This admission gives Joseph the
opportunity to stage a dramatic recreation of one brother's being
absent. First, he suggests that the brothers send one of their
group to fetch their brother Benjamin. And then he immedi-
ately makes it impossible for them to act on this suggestion by
locking them up for three days. He plants the idea that they
deprive themselves of another one of their number by sending
him on a mission to Canaan and then he reminds them of what
they did to Joseph by throwing them all into confinement.
Then Joseph appears to them and makes a remarkable
appeal to moral conscience. He is about to change the proposal
but introduces his shift by saying "I fear God."3 2 The equivalent
one would use today would be, "I am a moral person." Or: "I
answer to a higher power." For example, when the midwives in
Egypt refused to obey Pharaoh's command to kill all the male
children born to Jewish women, they are described as "fearing
God."33 Joseph implicitly appeals to his brothers to bring to bear
their own moral conscience.
As a "moral person," Joseph tell his brothers that they
should take grain back to Canaan and fetch Benjamin but that
they should leave one brother with him as a surety. At this point
the brothers are moved to confess: "And they said to one
another: But we are guilty [asham in the plural form] concerning
our brother."34 They experience an awakening of conscience.
Though they thought they knew what they had done, they appre-
ciate its meaning for the first time.
Moral transformations rarely arise from a finite set of fac-
tors. In this case we can point at most to a set that separately or
in combination might have generated the brothers' realization
that they had committed a great wrong. They are: (1) their
spending three days in confinement, which somehow brought
home to them the experience of Joseph in the pit, (2) Joseph's
invoking the idea of "fearing God," (3) Joseph's playing on their
incompleteness as a set of brothers, first by insisting that they
bring Benjamin down to Egypt, then suggesting that they send
home to fetch him, and finally requiring that one be left behind
while the others seek to complete their numbers, and (4) finally,
31. Genesis 42:31.
32. Genesis 42:18 (King James Version).
33. Exodus 1:17.
34. Genesis 42:21.
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and speculatively, the possibility that Joseph himself planted the
seed by expressing a longing to be rescued as Dinah had been.
The beauty of the text is enabling us to understand that this
human breakthrough could have happened without understand-
ing the process of moral change.
What they do feel guilty about? Reuben suggests that they
should feel guilty about having killed Joseph. He says that his
"blood must be redeemed," which is a classic biblical formula for
punishing homicide. 5 That is what Reuben originally believed
and perhaps what the other brothers also believed from the very
beginning. 6
Significantly, however, the other brothers interpret their
guilt at a more abstract level. It is not about either throwing him
into the pit with the intention of either killing him or of letting
him die in the pit. Their guilt attaches to having nominally
heard but ignored his cries of anguish: "[T]hat we saw the
anguish of his soul and we not hear."37
This subtle relocation of the guilt could either be trivial or
profound. The trivial version derives from the way the brothers
use their declaration of guilt to explain their current misery:
Because we ignored his pleas, "our anguish has come over us. '"38
Thus, they rationalize their anguish as a response to their ignor-
ing someone else's anguish. This converts their confession of
guilt into a tactical mistake about controlling their personal fate.
The more profound interpretation of locating the brothers'
guilt in not hearing Joseph brings to bear a refined view of free-
dom of the will, a view generally associated in contemporary phi-
losophy with Harry Frankfurt.3 ' By analogy to the idea of
second-order volitions as the mechanism for regulating and
resisting first-order impulses, we should think of guilt as a sec-
ond-order failure to resist our baser impulses. It is understanda-
ble that the brothers would want to kill one of their own who
sought to rule over them, but they have resisted their base homi-
cidal impulses. Their second-order volition should have been to
heed Joseph's appeal for compassion. It does not matter much
35. See Genesis 9:6 ("Whoever spills the blood of a human being, by a
human being will his blood be spilled."). On the magical significance of releas-
ing the blood of the decedent, see DAVID DAUBE, STUDIES IN BIBLICAL LAW
122-23 (1947).
36. This assumption would contradict the widely held view that the broth-
ers sold Joseph into slavery. See Acts 7:9.
37. Genesis 42:21.
38. Id.
39. See generally HARRY G. FRANKFURT, THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE
ABOUT (1988).
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whether that appeal is implicit in Joseph's humanity or whether
it is articulated as cries for help. The point is that the brothers
did not hear it.
The metaphor of hearing fits the situation perfectly. We
"hear the voice" of conscience rather than read an image of con-
science in our mind and thus it makes sense for the brothers to
associate hearing with understanding the moral dimension of
their actions. Further, Jewish theology emphasizes hearing over
sight in the relationship with God. This is evident in Moses' con-
frontation with God on Mount Sinai and in the liturgical demand
on Israel to "hear" and understand that God is one. By contrast,
Christianity emphasizes the sense of sight and the role of images,
particularly of Jesus on the cross, in sustaining faith.
III. THE CONFLICTING PARADIGMS OF GUILT
In these portions of Genesis, we encounter radically
opposed conceptions of guilt. The first view is that guilt is associ-
ated with pollution in the objective sphere; the second, with feel-
ings in the subjective realm. Along with this contrast go several
others. Guilt-as-pollution is a fixed quantity, the same for every-
one; guilt-as-feeling is a matter of degree, different in each per-
son. Although both of these ideas are present in Genesis, only
the subjective view has survived in our conscious thinking about
criminal liability.
The assumption of modern criminal law is that some people
are more guilty than others. Their relative degrees of guilt
depend on two factors: first, how much they contribute or how
close they come to causing physical harm, and second, their
internal knowledge of the action and its risks. The principal who
controls the actions leading to harm is more guilty than the
accessory who merely aids in execution of the plan. Those who
take risks intentionally are worse than those who do so inadver-
tently. These assumptions about relative guilt are built into the
modem way of thinking about crime and punishment.
These shifts from the external to the internal, and from the
categorical to the scalar, account for another conceptual
reorientation. Guilt-as-pollution was connected with a particular
kind of response-the sacrifice of animals in a religious ritual.
In the modern, secular understanding of guilt, the linkage is not
with sacrifice in the Temple but with punishment prescribed in
court. As sacrifice functions as means of cleansing the world of
pollution, punishment has the symbolic effect of canceling out
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the crime. As Michel Foucault put it, punishment reenacts the
crime and thus rids the world of the pollution it represents.4 °
This way of thinking about punishment carries forward and
transmutes the conception of guilt-as-pollution. It follows that
precisely as stains need to be eradicated, the guilty need to be
punished. As Oedipus and Abimelech are paradigmatic figures
for the theory of guilt-as-pollution, Raskolnikov is the exemplar
of the modern man who knows precisely what he has done but
fails initially to grasp the moral qualities of his actions.41 He cap-
tures the existential situation of all terrorists and ideological kill-
ers who know precisely what they have done but who have yet to
discover their guilt for having put their hand to evil. The process
of discovery carries with it the sudden explosion of truth.
Repression caves in, and truth overwhelms. The reaction can
often be violent, as in the case of Oedipus. Or it can be thera-
peutic and lead to a reconciliation with the victims or with one's
self.
The Joseph story is arguably an example of the therapeutic
response, a precursor to the Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion as an alternative to punishment in the transition to democ-
racy. Though Reuben thinks that Joseph's blood must be
redeemed by punishment, 42 in fact no blood was spilled and no
irreversible harm occurred to Joseph. The narrative leads not to
punishment but to reconciliation. Though the brothers are
united in the end, those who have wronged Joseph still fear
him.43 Their guilt is never fully expunged.
IV. SHAME IN GENESIS
In the modern approach to guilt, we are more likely to begin
with our feelings than follow the pattern of the ancients and
infer guilt for a plague or from a vision of God in a dream. As we
know from the tale of Joseph, however, it is difficult to rely on
feelings of guilt to generate an inference of guilt in fact-the
feelings thrive on psychological sources other than actions that
might occasion guilt for sins and crimes actually committed.
The centrality of the self in modern thought has led to a
general tendency to think about shame in place of guilt. If sin
and pollution are the favored foci of the ancients, shame has
40. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
45 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 1979) (1975).
41. See FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (David McDuff
trans., Penguin Books 1991) (1866).
42. Genesis 42:24.
43. Genesis 50:15.
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become the pet theme not only of contemporary psychiatry but
of philosophers and social critics attempting to come to grips
with crimes of the past.
Some rather simple distinctions hold between shame and
guilt. People feel shame for who and what they are, and guilt for
what they have done. Shame is felt in the eyes of others, real or
imagined, and for that reason is associated with seeing and being
seen (recall Oedipus putting out his eyes). Guilt is experienced
as the voice of conscience and therefore associated with the hear-
ing. Shame can often be irrational. For example, a hunchback
might feel ashamed for the contortions of his body, though there
is no suggestion of personal responsibility. You can feel shame
about the behavior of other people over which you have no con-
trol at all. Guilt, by contrast, has some connection to morality, to
right and wrong, to sources of conscience based on rational
criteria.
The sense of shame in the biblical context hardly differs
from the contemporary understanding. The leading pair of
passages frame the eating of the forbidden fruit by Adam and
Eve. Before they eat of the fruit, we encounter a negative refer-
ence to shame: "And they were both naked, the man and his wife,
and were not ashamed."" After they eat of the fruit, the reaction
seems to be the opposite: "And the eyes of them both were
opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig
leaves together, and made themselves aprons.""
5 The text does
not tell that they felt ashamed after eating the fruit, but this is
seemingly always inferred from their covering their genitals
immediately upon becoming aware of their nakedness. The
strong connection between the eyes and the sense of shame also
supports the reading of shame into the text after the eating of
the fruit.
The sentiment that you would expect Adam and Eve to have
is not shame but guilt. After all, they had just engaged in radical
disobedience of God's command. In the Christian theory they
are responsible for the "Fall" of humankind. They corrupt the
species and bring death into the world."6 This is an occasion for
guilt, if anything is. And yet we read exclusively about a reaction
of shame.
The core experience of shame is feeling exposed, subject to
the gaze of another. There is no suggestion in the text that
either Adam or Eve judged each other harshly, blamed each
44. Genesis 2:25 (King James Version).
45. Genesis 3:7 (King James Version).
46. Romans 5:12.
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other, felt guilt for anything in particular, but they were aware of
each other's eyes. And the first reaction to each other's eyes was
to sense the nakedness of that part of the body associated with
shame. The response to shame, as to nakedness, is to avoid the
gaze. This requires one to cover oneself up, as suggested by the
metaphor of clothing oneself in fig leaves.
Shame in individuals, we can conclude, has a sound ground-
ing both in our experience and in our mythology. The feature
that makes it different from responsibility and guilt, however, is
its nonrational quality. There is nothing logical about feeling
shame for one's genitals. And indeed in nudist colonies people
can easily overcome their habit of genital shame. Nor is there
anything well-reasoned about minorities feeling ashamed of the
way they are, with the resulting desire to conceal their origins
and stay "in the closet." On the whole, it seems that the practice
of coming out liberates people from the strictures of shame. Yet
at the same time, a strong sense of shame provides people with
sound moral restraints. Feeling ashamed for, say, cheating or
committing adultery is a healthy reaction that strengthens our
ties with others.
It is not surprising that guilt has played a much greater part
in the evolution of legal thinking than is the case with shame.
The impulse to pay reparations or to suffer punishment-all of
these responses are responses to guilt rather than shame. And
though the impulse will arise only if there are feelings or at least
a recognition of guilt, the operative feature of guilt in these con-
texts is not subjectivity but the objective aspect of pollution that
we have observed in biblical practices. Reparations and punish-
ment both serve symbolically to cleanse the stains of the past.
But these symbolic gestures hardly make sense unless they are
read against a biblical history rich in magical events of pollution
and cleansing.
